What is the Nature and Social Norm within the Context of In-Group Favouritism? by Harris, D. et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the Nature and Social Norm within the Context 
of In-Group Favouritism? 
 
 
Donna Harris, Benedikt Herrmann, and Andreas Kontoleon 
 
1 December 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
CWPE 1062 
 
 
What is the Nature of Social Norm within the Context of In-Group
Favouritism? ∗
Donna Harris†, Benedikt Herrmann‡, and Andreas Kontoleon§
December 1, 2010
Abstract
In-group favouritism behaviour is observed everywhere around the world and previous research has shown
that this behaviour is also easily triggered in a laboratory in various contexts. However, little is known about why
different magnitudes of in-group favouritism are observed across societies. In this paper, we use a new allocation
experiment to examine the nature of social norms within the context of in-group favouritism behaviour. In this
experiment, a decision-maker has to decide only once how to allocate a fixed amount of resource between each
of the three members of her own group and each of the three members of the out-group, whilst the decision-
maker’s own payoff is not affected by her decision. Three treatments are implemented: in the first treatment,
only the members of the in-group can punish the decision-maker. In the second treatment, only the members of
the out-group can punish the decision-maker. Finally, in the third treatment, only an independent third-party
observer can punish the decision-maker. The aim of these treatments is to test whether there is a prevailing
social norm which dominates the behavioural standard within the context of in-group favouritism and whether
this mechanism varies across different subject pools, namely Thailand and the UK.
Compared to a baseline treatment with no punishment opportunity, we observed that among the Thai sub-
jects in-group favouritism significantly increased once the in-group members were given the opportunity to punish
the decision-maker. The threat of punishment from a third-party punisher also increased in-group favouritism
in Thailand. However, when only the out-group members had the opportunity to punish, no change in in-group
favouritism behaviour was observed. On the contrary, within the British subject pool, when the out-group mem-
bers had the opportunity to punish the decision-maker, we observed a decline in in-group favouritism as well as
a marked shift towards an equitable outcome. The threats of punishments from the in-group members and the
third-party, on the other hand, did not have any impact on in-group favouritism behaviour in the UK. The results
suggest that within the Thai subject pool, there appears to be a prevailing ‘in-group bias norm’ which is strongly
enforced within and outside the group. Within the UK subject pool, however, it is less clear what the prevailing
norm is. Whilst the threat of punishment from the out-group members who directly lose out from favouritism
behaviour appeared to significantly reduce this behaviour, an uninvolved third-party was not willing to incur
a cost to punish this behaviour. This interesting result indicates two possible explanations: first, in-group
favouritism, in contrast to selfish or opportunistic behaviour, may not considered as a strong enough violation
of a social norm; and second, the norm of egalitarianism within the context of favouritism may still be ‘evolving’.
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1 Introduction
Favouritism is defined as preferential treatment given to an individual or a group at the expense of
others (Becker, 1957; Fershtman, Gneezy, and Verboven, 2005). Favouritism is widely observed in
both developed and developing countries and in various economic settings1. In-group favouritism, by
definition, implies that one group reaps most, if not all, the benefit. Therefore, at a group level this
behaviour could be considered as a form of in-group cooperation since it maximises the payoff of the
group and its members. In a world which only one group exists, the best strategy for the group members
is to favour each other. However, in reality more than one group exist and social interactions are not only
limited to individuals within the same group. When groups interact, a practice of in-group favouritism
by one group automatically means that those who do not belong to that particularly group lose out.
Consequently, at aggregate level in-group favouritism limits access to resources and opportunities for
the out-group and thus, leads to inequalities in income distribution and welfare lost for the society as
a whole.
Previous studies have shown that when negative externalities are created by an action or behaviour
of a group member, it is usually regulated by social norms which are enforced by the other members
of that particular social group (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Hoff et al,
2007). However, such a norm enforcement mechanism would only work effectively if there is a sufficient
consensus on which norm should be enforced. So far, the literature has generally focused on social
norms within one group (Fehr Fischbacher and Gaechter, 2002; Anderson and Putterman, 2005) or a
situation in which there is a universal consensus about the norm violating behaviour across groups, such
as selfish or opportunistic behaviour (Goette et al, 2006; Bernhard et al 2006a; Bernhard et al 2006b).
However, within the context of in-group favouritism, it is not clear what the underlying consensus for
the social norm is.
This paper will examine the nature of social norms, particularly how the power of norm enforcement
would be used with respect to favouritism behaviour. In doing so, we use ‘the favour game’ as developed
in Harris et al (2009), in which a decision-maker has to choose how to allocate a fixed amount of Tokens
between each of the three members of her own group and each of the three members of the out-
group. The game is played only once in order to avoid reciprocal motives from both within the group
(generalised reciprocity) and from the out-group (out-group fear effect)2. In addition, the decision-maker
receives a fixed payoff so that a self-interest motive does not interfere with ‘pure in-group favouritism’.
In this paper, we extend the design by applying three additional punishment treatments and providing
the power of costly punishment to the other in-group members (T1), the out-group members (T2), and
an uninvolved third-party observer (T3). In each treatment once the decision-maker makes an allocation
1For instance, favouritism is prevalent in recruitment and evaluation processes within firms and organisations (Prendergast and
Topel; 1996). The former World Bank president, Paul Wolfowitz, was charged with a violation of ethical and governance rules as the
Bank’s president by granting a promotion and a large pay rise to his long-term companion and was later forced to resign (Washington
Post, 2007). The former U.S. President, George W. Bush, was accused of favouritism after the nomination of Harriet Miers, who
had no previous judicial experience and demonstrated little knowledge of constitutional law, to the Supreme Court. Her selection was
rejected by many conservatives and liberals (The Economist, 2005). In a study of personal favouritism within the Federal Public Service
in Canada, independent auditors found evidence that qualifications had been tailored to favour a particular candidate or a group of
candidates, including changing education, language and security requirements, to match a specific candidate’s profile (Public Service
Commission of Canada, 2005). Finally, the manner in which governments procure goods and services can be complex and leaves plenty
of room for favouritism towards groups of suppliers (Evenett, 2002). In China, the concept of ‘guanxi ’ or ‘relationship’ plays a key role
in encouraging favouritism. Government officials tend to favour the members of the guanxi network in public expenditure decisions such
as the choice of government’s procurement partner and allocation of public resources (Wong and Chan, 1999). As a result, outsiders
who are able to offer better combination of cost and quality to win the bid for the contract and those who are in need of the public
resources are left out.
2In a repeated game, the in-group members may decide to favour their group because they believe that the other in-group members
would do the same in the next round (generalised reciprocity within group). Alternatively, the in-group members may favour their
group because they expect the out-group members to also favour their own group if the opportunity arises in the next round (out-group
fear)(Gaertner and Insko, 2000; Ng, 1981; Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000).
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decision, only one type of punisher (either in-group members, out group members or an independent
third-party) is informed about the decision and is asked to decide whether or not to reduce the income
of the DM at their own costs.
This experimental design will enable us to examine whether there exists a prevailing norm within the
context of favouritism as reflected by the allocation choice of the decision-maker in response to different
types of punishment and the actual punishment behaviour from the in-group, the out-group, and an
independent third-party. Consider a situation in which only one type of social norm prevails. Three
different possibilities could emerge: (i) If there is a consensus that in-group bias norm dominates the
behavioural standards, one would expect that the DM would be punished whenever she does not favour
the in-group. This punishment could come from either the other in-group members, the out-group
members, or the third-party; (ii) In contrast, if the norm of egalitarianism prevails, one would expect
that any deviation from equal division of the resource would result in punishment by all parties (in-group,
out-group, and third-party); (iii) Finally, in a more extreme case, if the norm of ‘out-group favouritism’
is the dominant social norm, one would observe that the DM who does not favour the out-group would
be punished. However, these scenarios are based on the assumption that only one type of social norm
prevails. It is also possible that within the context of favouritism two conflicting norms may be at
work. Within the group, the in-group members may strongly support the in-group bias norm since it is
beneficial to the group. On the other hand, individuals who belong to a different group (the out-group)
may support the norm of out-group favouritism or at least, the norm of egalitarianism. Therefore, the
second objective of this paper is to test whether this ‘conflict of social norms problem’ arises within the
context of resource allocation and the extent to which it may affect the level of favouritism within a
given society.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines our research hypotheses
and describes the experimental design. Section 3 reports the main results and Section 4 examines the
relationship between the subjects’ socio-economic characteristics and the behaviour observed in the
experiments and Section 5 concludes.
2 Research Hypotheses and Experimental Design
If there exists an in-group bias norm that requires the in-group members to treat each other more
favourably than those outside the group, a violation of this norm would trigger social sanctions from
the other in-group members. We posit that this in-group bias norm is likely to be strongly enforced
in a ‘collectivist’ society, in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong and cohesive
in-groups, often extended families (Hofstede, 2001). An example of this type of society was illustrated
in the work by Edward Banfield (1958), who studied the behaviour of people in a village in the Southern
regions of Italy. Banfield observed that within this village “the principles of good and evil apply only to
within family and are regarded as irrelevant to non-family members” - a behaviour, which he referred
to as ‘amoral familism’. In such a collectivist society, individuals who come from the same close-knit
group would treat in group members more favourably than those outside the groups and there would
be little loyalty to the larger community or acceptance of behavioural norms required to support others
outside their own group. In order to explore whether there is a correlation between collectivism and
in-group bias norm, we conduct the experiments in two different locations with very different degrees of
collectivism according to Hofstede’s ‘individualism’ dimension (IDV), namely Bangkok/Thailand (highly
collectivist), and Nottingham/UK (highly individualist). In an individualist society such as the UK,
where everyone is expected to look after their own well-being, in-group favouritism may be considered
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as a violation of the norm of egalitarianism. In this case, in-group favouritism would trigger social
sanctions from the out-group whose payoffs are directly affected. The enforcement from an independent
third-party observer who are not directly affected by favouritism, on the other hand, is likely to depend
on the type of prevailing norms within that society. If the in-group bias norm dominates the overall
behavioural standard - which may be the case for a collectivist society - the third-party is likely to
punish those who do not favour their own group, resulting in an increase in in-group favouritism.
The level of favouritism within a given society is likely to be determined by the probability that these
different types of social norms will be enforced (the credibility of the punishments) and the severity
of the sanctions - both of which depend on a number of factors: (i) whether there exists a prevailing
social norm and what type of norm it is; (ii) The relative importance attached by the punishers to the
prevailing norm; (iii) The ‘degree’ of the violation of the norm preferred by the punishers; and (iv)
The cost of punishment. Hence, the final observation of the different degrees of favouritism depends on
the ‘expectation’ of the decision-maker with respect to these conditions. Based on this motivation, we
explore the following hypotheses:
HYPOTHESIS 1 (In-group Punishment): The threat of punishment from the in-group mem-
bers is likely to increase the magnitude of favouritism, if the in-group bias norm prevails.
HYPOTHESIS 2 (Out-group Punishment): The threat of punishment from the out-group mem-
bers who directly lose out from favouritism is likely to reduce favouritism, if the norms of egalitarianism
or out-group favouritism prevails.
In conjunction with a decline in in-group favouritism, if the norm of egalitarianism dominates the
behavioural standards, one should also observe an increase in an ‘equal split’ decision. However, if the
norm of out-group favouritism prevails, one should observe an increase in out-group favouring decisions.
HYPOTHESIS 3 (Third-party Punishment): The threat of punishment from a third-party
norm enforcer who does not belong to either of the groups and whose payoff is not affected by favouritism
is likely to increase in-group favouritism in a society where the in-group bias norm prevails, whilst it is
likely to have the opposite effect in a society where the norms of egalitarianism or out-group favouritism
prevails.
We used the data of the baseline favour game (T0) without any punishment opportunity from
our previous paper (Harris et. al, 2009) as a benchmark to assess the extent to which punishment
opportunities from different social groups affect the level of in-group favouritism behaviour as shown
in Table 1. In baseline favour game, each subject was randomly matched with 6 other players and
each was endowed with 3,000 tokens. The subjects were clearly informed that they were not asked to
allocate this initial endowment and that they were not allowed to allocate any Tokens to themselves. In
order to create group identity, four subjects were randomly grouped together and were told that they
belonged to ‘group A’, whilst three other subjects were told that they were members of ‘group B’. Only
the members of group A were asked to make the allocation decisions. The reason for the asymmetrical
group size (four in group A and three in group B) was to maintain a constant group size for both groups
when the decisions were made. Since the members of Group A were not allowed to allocate any Tokens
to themselves, they had to decide how to allocate the Tokens between each of the other three other
members in group A and each of the three members in group B using a fixed allocation choice set as
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shown in Figure 1.
Table 1: The Treatments
Treatment Group Allocation game (n=7)
Favour game baseline T0
In-group Punishment T1
Out-group Punishment T2
Third-Party Punishment T3
Options A, B, and C represent different magnitudes/degrees of favouritism with option A being the
highest magnitude of favouritism. Option D allocated equal amounts of Tokens to both groups. Options
E, F, and G allocate more Tokens to the out-group members than the in-group members in the reverse
oder of options A, B, and C. This was in order to make the choice set symmetric and to allow for
out-group favouritism behaviour to be observed. Finally, option H allocated zero Tokens to both groups
in order to check for anti-social preferences (Fehr, Hoff and Kshetramade, 2008; Herrmann et al. 2008).
It is important to note that all of the options, except for option H, sumed up to the same total payoff
of 3,000 Tokens. This allowed us to examine the extent to which inequality in income distribution as
a result of favouritism could trigger social sanctions from different groups without possible confounds
from efficiency concerns.
Figure 1: The Choice Set
In addition to making the allocation decisions, the members of group A were also asked to ‘rate’
their preferences for each of the eight options in the choice set on a five-point scale: 1 (Dislike very
much), 2 (Dislike), 3 (Like), 4 (Like very much), and 0 (Indifferent). The aim of the preference rating
was to check consistency between preferences and actual decisions. Once all members of Group A made
their decisions and completed the preference rating, a throw of a dice randomly selected one decision to
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be implemented. The person whose decision was chosen automatically assumed the role of the decision-
maker and received a fixed payoff of 4,500 Tokens, which was equal to the highest allocated amount
within the allocation choice set. If the decision-maker was given a lower fixed payoff than the highest
prize that she could allocate to the other in-group members, she might refrain from choosing the option
which yielded higher payoffs to the other in-group members. According to Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
there are individuals who prefer egalitarian outcomes and dislike inequitable outcomes, particularly
when they are worse off than when they are better off. Hence, by giving the decision-maker the highest
possible payoff within the context of this game, we could avoid a possible confound from this type of
preference.
We also elicited beliefs about the allocation decision by asking the members of Group B what they
thought would be the option that the decision-maker would most likely choose. This was in order to
assess whether the out-group’s expectation coincided with the decision-maker’s behaviour. In addition,
we asked the members of Group B to make a hypothetical decision in case they were chosen to be
the decision-maker in order to assess whether their beliefs about what the in-group decision-maker
affected their (hypothetical) decisions. The results from the baseline favour game showed that telling
the subjects that they belonged to the same group sufficed to trigger in-group favouritism when the
in-group and the out-group consisted of three members.
In the in-group punishment treatment (T1), only the in-group members, who were not selected
to be the decision-maker, were given the opportunity to punish the decision-maker. This was common
knowledge to all players from the beginning of the experiment. All subjects were told that the experiment
consisted of two stages: In the first stage, the in-group members would be asked to make allocation
decisions and that only one decision would be randomly chosen to be implemented. In the second
stage, the selected choice (but not the personal identity of the decision-maker) would be revealed only
to the other in-group members who could then decide whether to punish the decision-maker. For a
cost of 100 Tokens, the other in-group members could each reduce the decision-maker’s payoff by 500
Tokens.3 As a result, the decision-maker’s payoff can be written as: pidm = 7, 500 −
∑3
n=1 Pin, where
7,500 Tokens is made up of 3,000 Tokens initial endowment and 4,500 Tokens fixed payment for being
selected to be the decision-maker, and Pin is the punishment imposed by each of the other in-group
members. The other in-group members’ payoff can be written as: piin = 3, 000 + T −C, where T is the
amount of Tokens allocated to them by the decision-maker, and C is the cost of punishment. In this
treatment the out-group was not given an opportunity to punish the decision-maker and thus, their
payoffs were determined by the choice of the decision-maker. There was also no third-party punisher
in this treatment. Consequently, the likelihood that favouritism would be observed depended upon
whether the decision-maker was concerned about equitable outcomes amongst all other individuals
(generalised inequity aversion), and on the decision-maker’s belief about the type of social norm which
was upheld by the other in-group members. If she believed that the in-group bias norm prevailed, and
thus, was strongly enforced within the group (the threat of punishment was credible), we should observe
an increase in in-group favouritism decisions (options A, B, and C) by the decision-makers.
The out-group punishment treatment (T2) gave an opportunity for the out-group members to
punish the decision-maker. Similar to the in-group punishment treatment, all subjects were told that
the experiment consisted of two stages but in the second stage, only the members of group B would be
allowed to deduct the decision-maker’s payoff at their own cost. After the decision-maker was selected,
her choice was then revealed to the out-group members and then similar to the in-group punishment, at
3We used neutral wording in all instructions. No loaded word such as ‘punish’ or ‘sanction’ was used, instead we used the word
‘deduct’.
6
a cost of 100 Token, each out-group member could deduct 500 Tokens from the decision-maker’s payoff.
If the decision-maker believed that the norms of egalitarianism or out-group favouritism prevailed, we
should observe a shift in the allocation decisions towards an equal split option or options that favour
the out-group (options E, F, and G) respectively in this treatment. However, if the group bias norm
prevailed, we could observe an increase in in-group favouritism behaviour since the decision-maker would
also expect the out-group to follow such norm.
Finally, we carried out a third-party punishment treatment (T3) in order to measure the
likelihood that an uninvolved third-party would be willing to incur a cost in order to punish a behaviour
which she thought was a violation of the prevailing social norm. This treatment is very crucial in
examining what the underlying consensus for the social norm is within the context of favouritism. During
the first stage of the experiment, an independent third-party was asked to complete a short questionnaire
about their socio-economic background whilst the members of group A made the allocation decisions.
Once the decision was selected, it was revealed only to the third-party, who could decide whether to
punish the decision-maker. The third-party was given an endowment of 4,500 Tokens in the second stage
of the experiment which she could spend on punishment4. At a cost of 100 Tokens, the third-party
punisher could reduce the decision-maker’s payoff by 300 Tokens and the third-party punisher could
spend up to 1,500 Tokens, which would reduce the entire payoff of the decision-maker (4,500 Tokens).
Therefore, the third-party punisher had to feel sufficiently strong about the norm violation in order to
be willing to incur a cost to enforce the norm.
All experiments were carried out between August and November 2008 in Bangkok/Thailand and
Nottingham/UK with a total number of 577 subjects (and 133 subjects from T0). Two very different
subject pools were used for three main reasons: firstly, in order to test the robustness of our experi-
mental design; secondly, to examine whether there was heterogeneity in the prevailing norm regarding
favouritism between a highly collectivist society (Thailand) and a highly individualist society (the UK);
and finally, to explore whether there is a correlation between collectivism and the prevalence of the
in-group bias norm. Most of the subjects in both subject pools were undergraduate students randomly
selected from different faculties5. In Thailand, the experiments were conducted at Chulalongkorn Uni-
versity in Bangkok with 351 students. In the UK, the experiments were carried at the University of
Nottingham with 359 subjects6. Of the 351 subjects who participated in our experiments in Thailand,
95% were undergraduate students from Bangkok with an average age of 21 years old and 40% were
male. Within the UK subject pool, 99% of 359 subjects were undergraduate students with the same
average age as the Thai subject pool and 55% were male. Summary statistics for each treatment are
shown in Table 2.
4This endowment was the equivalent of the fixed payoff of the decision-maker because if the third-party’s payoff was lower than
the decision-maker’s, she might want to reduce the decision-maker purely because of ‘disadvantageous inequity aversion’ (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999). Therefore, we made sure that the third-party received the same fixed payoff of 4,500 Tokens as the decision-maker
prior to asking her to make the punishment decision.
5Small proportions of the subjects were Masters and PhD students.
6In Bangkok, the subjects were recruited manually using networks of student representatives across different faculties within Chu-
lalongkorn University, whilst at the University of Nottingham, the subjects were recruited via ORSEE self-recruiting system (Greiner,
2003).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics: Thailand and UK Subject Pools
Variables T0 T1 T2 T3
Thai UK Thai UK Thai UK Thai UK
Total number of obs. 70 63 84 84 77 84 120 128
Male 67% 35% 42% 55% 49% 65% 39% 52%
Average Age 23 21 20 20 20 20 20 20
Undergraduate 49% 87% 100% 98% 96% 100% 98% 100%
Study Economics 76% 14% 56% 14% 17% 15% 22% 16%
Mean group equality attitude [std. dev.]* 3.63 4.38 3.17 4.15 2.97 4.53 3.44 4.29
[2.07] [1.69] [2.15] [1.77] [2.22] [1.54] [2.06] [1.63]
Note: *The group equality attitude question asks whether the subjects agree with the statement ‘We should do what
we can to equalize conditions for different groups.’ (1= Extremely Negative, 6= Extremely Positive, 0=Neutral).
We were extremely careful with the experimental procedures in both countries. The protocols used
in the Thai experiments were translated to Thai and back-translated to English by the first author,
whose first language is Thai, and the Thai research assistants in order to ensure comparability of the
procedures between the two subject pools. After the subjects were all seated, each was given a written
instruction. The decisions were then made in private separated by partitions. Each treatment lasted
approximately 50 minutes and at the end of the experiment, the subjects were asked to complete a post-
experimental questionnaire, which consisted of questions regarding their socio-economic background and
attitudes towards group equality. The average payments across all treatments were 165 Baht (3 Pounds)
for the Thai subject pool and 6.50 Pounds for the UK subject pool. Comparable exchange rates were
implemented between the two subject pools. In Thailand, the exchange rate was 100 Tokens = 2 Baht.
In the UK, the exchange rate was 100 Tokens = 7 pence. Each subject in the UK received an on time
show-up fee of 3 Pounds and each subject in Thailand received 70 Baht (around 1.50 Pounds) for their
show-up fee. All of the treatments were administered by Z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007)
3 The Results
RESULT 1: The threat of in-group punishment significantly increased the overall level
and magnitude of favouritism in Thailand but not in the UK subject pool.
Observed Decisions
Compared to the baseline treatment where there was no punishment opportunity (T0), the overall
level of favouritism increased sharply from 58% to 83% within the Thai subject pool when the in-
group members were given the opportunity to punish the decision-maker. In terms of the magnitude
of favouritism, the proportion of the option which yielded the maximum payoff of 4,500 Tokens to the
in-group members (option A) increased from 10% to 23%, whilst the proportion of option C which
allocated slightly more to the in-group members (2,000 Tokens) than the out-group members (1,000
Tokens) also rose from 23% to 44%. On the other hand, the proportion of option B which allocates
3,000 Tokens to the in-group members and nothing to the out-group members declined slightly from
25% to 17%. More importantly, there was a significant drop in the proportion of equal distribution
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(option D) from 33% to 15%. These changes resulted in the significant treatment effect compared to
the baseline (Mann-Whitney (without option H): z = 2.01, Prob > |z| = 0.04).
Within the UK subject pool, the overall level of favouritism was already high even without punish-
ment (81%). When the punishment opportunity was given to the other in-group members, this level
increased slightly to 85% and there was also a small drop in the equal split option (option D) from 19%
to 13%. The threat of in-group punishment did not appear to have a significant impact on favouritism
behaviour, however, as the treatment effect was statistically insignificant (Mann-Whitney (without op-
tion H): z = 0.94, Prob > |z| = 0.35). Preference ratings in both subject pools showed a consistency
between the observed decisions and the subjects’ preferences. Only small proportions of the subjects in
both Thailand and the UK exhibited anti-social preference by choosing option H (2%).
These findings are also supported by our questionnaire data on the group equality attitude. Thai
subjects who participated in this treatment appeared to be less concerned about equality across different
groups as the average attitude towards group equality of the Thai subjects was lower (3.63) than that
in the UK (4.38) as shown in Table 2. It was, therefore, possible that within the Thai subject pool the
in-group bias norm dominated the behavioural standards within the group and thus, it was expected
to be enforced among the in-group members. Failing to favour one’s own group could be perceived as a
violation of this norm and thus, social sanctions from the other in-group members could be expected.
The credibility of the threat of in-group punishment was shown by the large increases in both the overall
level and magnitude of favouritism (options A, B, and C) amongst the Thai subjects. However, this
was not the case in the UK where, despite the high baseline level of favouritism, the threat of in-group
punishment did not significantly change the subjects’ behaviour.
Out-group’s Belief
Whilst the in-group members were making the decisions, the out-group members were asked to indi-
cate the option which they believed the decision-maker would most likely choose once the punishment
opportunity was given to the other in-group members. 75% and 97% of the out-group members in
Thailand and the UK respectively believed that in-group favouritism would be observed. These propor-
tions were higher than when no punishment opportunity was present and also matched well with the
actual observed behaviour of the decision-makers. In addition, the out-group members were also asked
to make a hypothetical allocation choice in the case that they were given the role of the decision-maker.
The majority of the out-group members in both Thailand and the UK (67% and 78% respectively) also
chose to favour their own group. The summary of the results is shown in Figure 2.
Punishment Behaviour
The actual punishment behaviour of the other in-group members showed that the majority of the
other in-group members in both subject pools (75% in Thailand and 92% in the UK) chose not to
punish the decision-makers. In Thailand, of the 25% who chose to punish, on average the option which
was punished most severely was option B (3,000:0) with an average punishment of 600 Tokens, followed
by option D (equal split) and option C (2,000: 1,000). Option A which was the highest magnitude of
favouritism, however, received the least punishment. Within the UK subject pool, options C and D
were punished the most, whilst option A was not punished at all as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 2: The DM’s Behaviours and the Out-groups’ Beliefs for In-group Punishment Treatment (T1) as compared
to the Baseline (No Punishment): Thailand vs. UK
Figure 3: Average Punishment by the Other In-group Members
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RESULT 2: The threat of out-group punishment reduced the overall level and magni-
tude of favouritism in the UK, but not in Thailand.
Observed Decisions
As shown in Figure 4, very different results were observed when the opportunity of punishment
was given only to the out-group members whose payoffs were directly affected by favouritism. Within
the UK subject pool, there was a significant decline in the overall level and magnitude of favouritism
behaviour once the decision-makers were informed that the out-group could punish them. The propor-
tions of options A, B, and C dropped sharply from 81% to 52%, whilst the proportion of the equal
split option rose from 19% to 38%. Compared to the baseline treatment with no punishment opportu-
nity (T0), the Mann-Whitney (without option H) test showed a significant treatment effect (z = −2.4,
Prob > |z| = 0.02). It is also interesting to note that the threat of out-group punishment also led
to some out-group favouritism behaviour within the UK subject pool (10%), within which 4% of the
decision-makers went as far as giving the maximum payoff of 4,500 Tokens to the out-group, even at
the expense of her own group members. On the contrary, within the Thai subject pool, the overall
level of favouritism actually increased from 58% in T0 to 70% in this treatment, whilst generalised
inequity aversion decreased slightly from 33% to 25%. However, there was no significant treatment
effect (Mann-Whitney (without option H): z = 1.61, Prob > |z| = 0.11). The preference ratings of
all subjects showed consistency between the subjects’ preferences and decisions. Only one subject in
Thailand showed anti-social preference by chosing to allocate zero Tokens to both groups (option H),
whilst none of the UK subjects chose this option.
Figure 4: The DM’s Behaviours and the Out-groups’ Beliefs for Out-group Punishment Treatment (T2) as compared
to the Baseline (No Punishment): Thailand vs. UK
Out-group’s Belief
Interestingly, the belief data showed that even when punishment opportunity was available to the
out-group members, the majority of the out-group members (79% and 89% in Thailand and the UK
respectively) still expected that the decision-makers would choose to favour their own group. This could
suggest that within the context of an allocation of a fixed resource, there was a general expectation for
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in-group favouritism even when there was a probability that such behaviour would be punished by those
who were negatively affected. On the contrary, when they were asked to make a hypothetical decision,
only 45% of the out-group members in Thailand and 58% of those in the UK chose to favour their own
group, whilst the rest chose to distribute the Tokens equally between the two groups.
Punishment Behaviour
As for the actual punishment decisions, 48% and 61% of the out-group members in Thailand and the
UK respectively chose not to impose punishment on the decision-makers. Of those who did in Thailand,
on average option B was punished most severely, followed by option C. Similarly, within the UK subject
pool, the highest average punishment was for option B, but option A was also strongly punished as
shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Average Punishment by the Out-group Members
RESULT 3: The threat of punishment from an uninvolved third-party significantly in-
creased favouritism within the Thai subject pool, but it did not have a significant impact
on allocation decisions amongst the UK subjects.
Observed Decisions
The third-party punishment treatment provided an important test for the prevailing social norm re-
garding favouritism since the third-party was not directly affected by favouritism and thus, her decision
to exercise the costly punishment power would be due to her willingness to enforce a social norm. We
found that within the Thai subject pool, the presence of the third-party punisher increased the overall
level of favouritism behaviour significantly from 58% in T0 (no punishment) to 83% in this treatment, al-
though this increase was mainly due to the sharp increase in the lower magnitude of favouritism (option
C) as shown in Figure 6. The proportion of option C, which allocated 2,000 Tokens to the in-group and
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1,000 Tokens to the out-group members, more than doubled from 23% in the baseline treatment with no
punishment to 48% in this treatment. More importantly, the equal split also sharply declined from 33%
in T0 to 17%. The treatment effect was also statistically significant (Mann-Whitney (without option H):
z = 1.68, Prob > |z| = 0.09). Within the UK subject pool the presence of the third-party punisher did
not have a significant impact on favouritism behaviour. The proportions of in-group favouring options
increased, but only slightly from 81% in T0 to 84% in this treatment. The treatmentment effect was
not significant compared to T0 (Mann-Whitney (without option H): z = −0.09, Prob > |z| = 0.92).
The preference ratings showed a consistency between subjects’ preferences and their decisions in the
experiment. None of the subjects in both Thailand and the UK exhibited anti-social preference.
Figure 6: The DM’s Behaviours and the Out-groups’ Beliefs for Third-Party Punishment Treatment (T3) as
compared to the Baseline (No Punishment): Thailand vs. UK
Out-group’s Belief
Similar to the previous treatments, the belief data showed that the majority of the out-group mem-
bers expected that most decision-makers would choose to favour their own group (76% in Thailand
and 88% in the UK). Therefore, the presence of the third-party punisher did not seem to affect the
expectation of favouritism behaviour in an allocation of fixed resource. When they were asked to make
hypothetical choice, 67% and 73% of the out-group members in Thailand and the UK respectively also
chose to favour their own group.
Punishment Behaviour
The majority of the third-party punishers in both subject pools (67% in Thailand and 94% in the
UK) decided not to exercise their punishment power. of those who decided to punish within the Thai
subject pool, option A was on average punished most severely, whilst other options only received low
levels of punishment. Within the UK subject pool, only one person out of 16 decided to punish and the
punishment was applied to option B. It is important to note that the number of third-party punishers
who decided to punish was extremely small (5 in Thailand and 1 in the UK) and thus, it was not
possible to draw substantial inference from this result. The interesting point here was that most of the
third-party punishers were not willing to incur a cost in order to punish the norm violation - whatever
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the norm might be, which was contrary to what was observed within the context of cooperation norm in
public goods experiment or prisoner’s dilemma and the norm of egalitarianism in ultimatum or dictator
games (Bernhard, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and Gaechter, 2000; Fehr, Fischbacher, Gaechter,
2002; Goette, Huffman, and Meier, 2006; Ostrom et al. 1992; Yamagishi, 1986).
Figure 7: Average Punishment by the Out-group Members
4 Socio-economic characteristics and Favouritism Behaviour
We ran Ordered Probit regressions of the decision variable (dependent variable) against the socioe-
conomic data from the post-experimental questionnaire, namely age, gender (1= male, 2= female),
proportions of economic students in both subject pools, group equality attitude, country dummy (1=
Thailand, 2= UK), and the level of acquaintance within each session in all of the treatments to check
for internal consistency. As shown in Table 3, the favour game with no punishment (T0), the proportion
of economics students within the Thai subject pool, attitude towards group equality, and the country
dummy significantly influenced the subjects’ decisions. The marginal effects of these variables showed
that, a larger proportion of economics students within the Thai subject pool increased the probability of
option A being chosen by 34%, whilst it reduced the probability that the subjects would choose option
C (low magnitude of favouritism) by 11% and the equal split option by 24%. Unsurprisingly, positive
attitude towards group equality decreased the probability that option A would be chosen by 31% and
increased the likelihood that the equal split option (as well as option C) would be chosen by 10% and
21% respectively. The marginal effect of the country dummy showed that the UK subjects were more
likely to choose favouritism options, particularly option A and B, whilst most of the Thai subjects
were more likely to chose the low magnitude of favouritism (option C). For the in-group punishment
and the out-group punishment treatments (T1 and T2), none of the covariates appeared to significantly
influence the subjects’ allocation decisions. For the third-party punishment treatment (T3), the country
dummy appeared to significantly influenced the behaviour observed in the experiment. The marginal
effect of the country dummy showed that the UK subjects were to be more likely to choose options A
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and B, but less likely to choose options C and D.
Table 3: Ordered Probit Regression Results (Dependent Variable = Choice)
Independent Variables T0 T1 T2 T3
Age -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.05
[-0.71] [-0.38] [-0.58] [0.72]
Gender -0.18 0.09 -0.09 0.06
[-0.66] [0.36] [-0.38] [0.28]
Study Economics (UK) 0.14 0.45 0.22 -0.31
[0.17] [0.98] [0.57] [-0.85]
Study Economics (Thai) -1.00 -0.20 -0.12 -0.38
[-2.42]** [0.45] [-0.29] [-1.05]
Group Equality 0.90 0.41 0.18 -0.16
[2.56]*** [1.57] [0.67] [-0.61]
Country -1.19 -0.64 0.14 -0.50
[-2.97]*** [-1.58] [0.45] [-1.92]**
Level of acquaintance 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00
[0.40] [0.57] [0.55] [-0.11]
Number of Observations 76 96 92 124
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.04
Note: In brackets is z-statistics, * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1%. Group
equality attitude question asks whether the subjects agree with the statement ‘We should do what we can to equalize
conditions for different groups.’ (1= Extremely Negative, 6= Extremely Positive, 0=Neutral). We code 1 = positive
attitude towards group equality (scales 4, 5, and 6) and 0 = otherwise.
5 Discussions and Concluding Remarks
Our results provide an interesting insight to the nature of social norm regarding favouritism within the
context of an allocation of fixed resource. Whilst opportunistic and selfish behaviour has been shown to
be universally frown upon and punished by strangers, the in-group, the out-group, and the uninvolved
third-party (Carpenter and Matthews, 2007), we have shown that this is not the case for favouritism.
In Thailand, which is a highly collectivist society according to the Hofstede’s index (2001), favouritism
appeared to be considered as part of the in-group bias norm as shown by the overwhelming shift in
the decision-makers’ choices towards higher level and magnitude of favouritism once the other in-group
members were given the opportunity to punish the decision-makers, as compared to the baseline where
there was no punishment opportunity. Since there was no way that the decision-makers could find out ex
ante whether the other in-group members would exercise their punishment power or not until after the
allocation decisions were made, the main reason for the increase in the proportion of in-group favouring
options was likely to be influenced by their expectations that if they failed to favour their group, they
would be punished. This result reflected the credibility of the threat of punishment from the other
in-group members and that the in-group bias norm was strongly enforced. In addition, there was also
a high expectation for favouritism from the out-group. All of which provided the first indication that
the in-group bias norm was the prevailing social norm within the Thai subject pool.
However, within the UK subject pool, the result was more puzzling. Whilst we observed a high level
of favouritism already in the baseline treatment without punishment and that in-group favouritism
15
seemed to be expected by the out-group (in both baseline and in-group punishment treatments), the
in-group bias norm did not appear to be strongly enforced amongst the in-group members. This was
shown by the fact that the threat of in-group punishment did not have a significant effect on the
decision-makers’ behaviour. In terms of punishment behaviour, the majority of in-group members did
not choose to exercise their punishment power in both subject pools, this could be because most of the
decision-makers already chose to favour the in-group members in the first stage of the experiment (due
to the expectation that they would be punished if they did not do so) and, thus, there was no reason
to exercise the punishment power7.
Interestingly, when the punishment opportunity was given to the out-group, there was a significant
drop in favouritism decisions amongst the UK subjects. In addition, we also observed a sharp increase in
the proportion of equal split option and a small shift towards out-group favouritism options. Therefore,
it was not clear which type of social norm prevailed within the UK subject pool. However, if the norm
of out-group favouritism dominated the behavioural standards, we should not have observed such a
large increase in the equal split option, if at all. The marked increase in the equal split option could,
therefore, suggest that the norm of egalitarianism was more strongly enforced, as compared to the norm
of out-group favouritism. Our results suggested that in an individualist society such as the UK, where
everyone was expected to look after their own payoffs (Hofstede, 2001) and where the average attitude
towards group equality was relatively high according to our post-experimental questionnaire (4.15 for
this treatment compared to 3.17 within the Thai subject pool), the threat of out-group punishment
appeared to be effective in deterring favouritism. The decision-makers anticipated that favouritism
would trigger social sanctions from the out-group members and thus, refrained from favouring their
own group. Although the results from the actual punishment behaviour showed that the majority of
the out-group did not exercise their punishment power. Similar to the in-group punishment treatment,
this could be because of the fact that the majority of the decision-makers already shifted their decisions
towards the equal split option and thus, the out-group did not feel the need to punish them. But of
those who decided to punish, they did indeed punish the decision-makers who chose options A and B,
which were the high magnitudes of favouritism, most severely. However, this result was not observed in
Thailand. In fact, the proportions of favouritism options actually increased once the decision-makers
learned that the out-group members were given the opportunity to punish them, although this increase
was not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the fact that the majority of the out-group members
in the Thai subject pool did not seem to be outraged by favouritism even when their payoffs were
directly affected and chose not to exercise their punishment power, offered the second indication that
the in-group bias norm was likely to dominate the behavioural standards within the Thai subject pool.
Finally, the presence of a third-party punisher significantly increased favouritism amongst the Thai
decision-makers, which provided the third and most crucial evidence that the in-group bias norm pre-
vailed within the context of favouritism in a highly collectivist society, such as Thailand. The decision-
makers’ expected that the in-group bias norm would be enforced by the third-party who viewed this
norm as more important than, for instance, the norm of egalitarianism and thus, chose to favour their
own group even more. However, within the UK subject pool, the threat of the third-party punishment
did not change the decision-makers’ behaviour. Contrary to the results from the out-group punishment
treatment, favouritism did not appear to be considered as a violation of the norm of egalitarianism by
the third-party that could cause them to be willing to incur a cost in order to punish the decision-makers
who favoured their own group. According to punishment behaviour results, only one third-party within
the UK subject pool decided to punish.
7The responses from the post-experimental questionnaire also confirmed that they did not feel the need to punish the decision-makers.
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Based on our results, it was clear that a highly collectivist society such as Thailand the in-group
bias norm appeared to dominate the behavioural standards both within and outside the group. This,
in turn, helped to foster and encourage favouritism behaviour. On the contrary, the results from the
UK subject pool were more puzzling. On the one hand, favouritism was largely observed among the
in-group members and was also widely expected by the out-group, which initially suggested that the
in-group bias norm may be at work. However, the results from the in-group punishment treatment
showed that the norm of in-group bias did not seem to be enforced. On the other hand, those who were
directly affected by it appear to be outraged and thus, when given the opportunity, they were willing
to incur a cost to punish people who engaged in favouritism. In contrast, those who were not directly
affected were less concerned about it and were, therefore, not willing to incur a cost in order to get
involved. Consequently, there seemed to be no clear prevailing norm regarding favouritism within the
UK subject pool. This interesting result indicates two possible explanations: first, in-group favouritism,
in contrast to selfish or opportunistic behaviour, may not considered as a strong enough violation of
a social norm; and second, the norm of egalitarianism within the context of favouritism may still be
‘evolving’. Our future research is to explore other subject pools within the UK and also within other
societies with high and low levels of individualism dimension in order to confirm these initial findings.
Nevertheless, our study has certainly paved way for a better understanding of the underlying social
norms regarding favouritism which can help shed a light on why we observe a variation in the level of
favouritism across different types of societies.
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